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It is not a simple thing to know what the rule of law is or why it is established when and
where it is established. This is a highly preliminary effort.
On one view, the rule of law is associated with regularity and predictability, so that it
facilitates value-creating behavior by virtue of the stability of expectations it engenders: it is, in
the language of game theory, a coordination mechanism (Weingast). * On another view, the rule
of law is a system of governance by rules that have content conforming to certain minimal
ideals—for example, that they be general, public, promulgated in advance, possible to obey, and
so on, that, in other words, they conform to an “inner morality” (Fuller).

There are also

competing views of the supports for the rule of law where it becomes established. On one side
are those who claim that the rule of law becomes established where its products are useful,
especially to politicians (Shapiro and Stone Sweet). On the other are those who suggest that lawabiding behavior is the product of a belief in the rightness of obedience (Tyler). Although these
reasons do not relate to the same phenomena, still we might say that on one side is a view of the
subject that emphasizes utility, while on the other is a view that emphasizes conformity to ideals
or embeddedness in culture.

*

Lacking time for a full list of references, the parentheticals provide a few authors’ names.
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Now it is striking that neither view can account easily for the initial growth of the rule of law
in a given country. It is very difficult to know a priori whether an institution such as the rule of
law will have utility, and if the institution is new it is, by definition, not embedded in a local
culture. While either of these features is consistent with perpetuation of the rule of law once
established, something more is required to explain how it gets established.
This sort of origination puzzle is particularly acute for the rule of law for two reasons. First,
insofar as the rule of law demands obedience even when it is inconvenient and insofar as it binds
governors as well as the governed it habitually gets in the way of the powerful. So they have
every reason to reject it. Second, we know that for most societies the idea of law as embodying
purposive human action to create rules that affect behavior—as opposed to law as a series of
divine commands or law as simple dispute resolution with only implicit reference to general
rules—was alien until a century or two ago. And this may give us a clue to whether we need to
choose between the two views with which we began. In most of Asia, Africa, and the Middle
East, the rule of law was brought by colonial powers. Is it not plausible to assume that, all else
equal, the longer and deeper the colonial imprint the more likely the rule of law was to establish
itself in the collective consciousness of those subject to it? Jens Meierhenr that argues that the
South African transition from apartheid was facilitated by the existence of law and courts that,
outside the area of apartheid, had a long tradition of legality that allowed the contending forces
to trust each others’ commitments as the process unfolded. And it seems likely that the depth of
the colonial legal inheritance in India has facilitated the embeddedness of the rule of law and the
practice of judicial review by the Supreme Court of India.
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None of this, however, tells us how such a tradition gets started if it is not transplanted and
nurtured by a (paradoxically authoritarian) colonial power. Why is it that so many judicial
training programs fail to produce independent judiciaries?** It would take a herculean historical
analysis to demonstrate that there is a single path to this destination, but at least one plausible
route involves a certain configuration of factional alignments.
In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu declares that “there is no liberty if the judiciary
power be not separated from the legislative and executive” (I: XI: § 6). Under what conditions is
this separation likely to be achieved? If the executive dominates the legislature, as it does in a
considerable number of Asian and African states, even states with relatively democratic
elections, the judiciary is most unlikely to be able to marshal the resources to create and maintain
its own independence. It is, as Hamilton famously says in Federalist Number 78, the “least
dangerous branch,” possessed of “neither the purse nor the sword,” which is to say it is
inherently weak and dependent on external support for its independence. That external support
is most likely to be forthcoming when the executive and legislature are divided, when there is a
strong minority in the legislature, or when a nominally united ruling party is strongly divided by
factional loyalties. At such times, courts can count on support from those who oppose the
executive to shield them from reprisals for decisions that affect the executive’s interests.
If this is correct, it suggests that judicial independence in many states must await the
development of serious competitive politics in the political branches (Ginsburg; others, too).
The courts cannot lead democratic reform; they are the beneficiaries of that reform. No amount
**

From this point on, I operationalize the rule of law as judicial independence, even though it

undoubtedly involves much more than that.
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of judicial training, no normative commitment to the rule, no imported statutes, or new court
houses, or computerized case management systems can substitute for the protection that judges
can have when political elites are divided.
Even then, judicial independence can be precarious if the executive is willing to incur the
political costs of suppressing it. Consider an illustration from Malaysia.
In 1986 and 1987, in a series of cases, the Malaysian courts had ruled against the
government. The cases were politically sensitive. One involved the withdrawal of a foreign
journalist’s work permit, another the detention of an opposition politician, a third a government
contract awarded to an influential firm. On the horizon was an appeal that would determine the
lawfulness of a close vote in an internal political party election in which Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad had narrowly defeated a challenge from a former political ally. The future
of the ruling party and of the prime minister himself was at stake. Before the appeal was heard,
the lord president of the Supreme Court was suspended, the hearing was postponed, and a
tribunal was constituted to decide whether the lord president should be dismissed. When a five
member panel of the Supreme Court issued a stay of that tribunal’s proceedings, all five judges
were suspended, and two of them were ultimately dismissed.

When the party case was

eventually heard by a reconstituted bench, the prime minister’s faction prevailed. The Malaysian
judiciary, previously relatively compliant, was taught an unforgettable lesson in subservience.
It may have been accidental that the courts had felt at liberty to thwart the government in the
series of cases that brought on the crisis, but it seems likely that the new atmosphere of political
competition freed up the space for judicial independence. For the first time in decades, there had
been a credible challenge to a ruling party accustomed to winning large majorities at the polls. It
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turned out, however, that the prime minister had many more resources than were possessed by
his opponents and infinitely more than the courts. Elites interested in the rule of law could
murmur their dissatisfaction, and a few, including the dismissed lord president, could publish
their critiques, but that was the limit of their ability. It may have seemed that political power was
evenly divided between the two factions, but ultimate power was in the hands of one side alone.
Contrast the configuration in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto in 1998. The Indonesian
courts have been, for decades, generally corrupt, incompetent, and subservient to political
authority, so much so that their deplorable state was one reason for creating a constitutional
court: it could be constituted and composed completely from scratch. In the first several years
of its existence, the Indonesian constitutional court has shown signs of upholding the rule of law
in ways undreamt of in Suharto’s time. What, then, are its supports?
To answer this, a look at post-Suharto political alignments is indispensable. Early on, party
leaders in the legislature were confronted with crowds in the street—competing crowds,
antagonistic to each other and threatening extensive civil violence or warfare—and party leaders
agreed to work together to reform the constitution and effectuate the transition to democracy.
Their cooperation was facilitated by the fact that, electorally, they were only partially
competitive with each other, for Indonesian parties are, in considerable measure, embedded in
particular aliran or streams: modernist Muslim, traditionalist Muslim, or secular nationalist. Of
course, their efforts were only cooperative within limits; notwithstanding the quasi-ascriptive
basis of their core support, party fortunes rose and fell at the polls in 1999 and 2004. But,
crucially, no party came close to dominating government. After the 2004 elections, the strongest
party held fewer than one-quarter of the seats, and the ticket that ran successfully for president
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and vice-president came from two different parties, as did all the competing tickets. The result
since then has been a factional equilibrium (albeit perhaps increasingly fragile), in which
courts—in this case, the Constitutional Court—has room in which to operate with some
independence. (Even then, reform of the ordinary courts, which are often corrupt or incompetent,
has been agonizingly slow.)

There is certainly no equivalent of Mahathir, who can

singlehandedly dismiss judges. If anyone tried to use formal powers for this purpose, others
would step up to prevent it. Factional balance is the key to creating this space.
But what about factional balance with sharper elbows? Suppose there is violence or even
warfare among groups competing to dominate the state. Under these circumstances, the courts
can scarcely expect that their rulings in one direction or another will not encounter serious
resistance from those who are disadvantaged by those rulings. And, indeed, it is difficult to
identify any case of extreme civil violence in which courts were able to create or possibly even
to maintain their independence. If this is correct, then, in general, it could be concluded that
there is a curvilinear relation between divided power and judicial independence. Where a single
party or military regime controls a state, the rule of law is not likely to emerge; where there is a
serious division of power in a state, the rule of law is more likely to emerge; but where factional
disputes preempt factional cooperation altogether, the rule of law is likely to suffer. Under such
conditions, factional protection is no longer available for judicial independence. When warfare
breaks out, the rule of law will generally decline, because warfare usually entails substantial
deviations from legality, as it has, for example, in Sri Lanka on the government side over the last
two decades. On the rebel side, what often emerges to replace the courts are crude, nonprofessional adjudicators operating arbitrarily within the ambit of the rebels’ ideology, favoring
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supporters and disfavoring opponents in the territory they control. This is far from the rule of
law, and it resembles the single-party situation, only with generally greater brutality.
Probabilistically, it is likely that the curvilinear relationship just postulated is correct; but,
before it is written in stone, a step back into the literature of the rule of law and judicial
independence is warranted. That literature suggests there may be more than one path to the rule
of law.
An alternative path is suggested by Shapiro and Stone Sweet, who argue that a major route to
the legitimacy of judicial review consists of the ability of courts to make themselves useful to
political decision makers. They cite judicial review as a way of helping to police boundaries
between the central government and the states or provinces in federal countries. This becomes
the opening wedge to judicial review more broadly. Their argument is that a federal system
requires a neutral umpire, and for this purpose judicial independence is accepted, whereupon
judicial review can be extended to other areas. Shapiro and Stone Sweet do not see this as the
only path to wide-ranging judicial review, but as a common path. Their main point is that the
rule of law often flourishes when the courts make themselves useful to those holding political
power.
Similar arguments have been made by others, who suggest that, by adjudicating citizen
complaints, courts can provide useful information to rulers about the performance of the
bureaucracy (Rosberg, cited in Widner). Jennifer Widner proposes a three-step process of
legitimizing judicial independence. First, the courts can make themselves useful by helping
politicians root out corruption and by serving as a neutral arbiter between or among factions.
Once they have this basic authority, courts can take the second step: building public support by
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displaying their neutrality and efficiency to the public. The third step, according to Widner’s
study of Tanzania, is to encourage the growth of party competition, on the assumption that a
competitive landscape furnishes a more secure environment for judicial independence. All of
this assumes that first step, concerning corruption and factions, is one that political leaders are
happy to have courts take. Often they will not be. Recall the Malaysian case, which involved a
factional dispute.
There are other ways for the courts to make themselves useful, such as by providing a neutral
forum for foreign investors who might otherwise fear for their capital. Many states that wish to
attract foreign capital nevertheless do not see the need for the assistance of an independent
judiciary, so the hypothetical existence of this function may not lead to the rule of law, as it has
not in China. Alternatively, commercial disputes may be adjudicated fairly, as they are in
Singapore, while political disputes are not, as they are not in Singapore. Likewise, even an
authoritarian regime may wish to build public support by reassuring its subjects that the worst
forms of arbitrariness will receive judicial correction. Widner cites Uganda under Museveni, but
this is clearly an exceptional case.
Other writers argue that judicial independence emerges when current leaders are uncertain of
their prospects and wish to build in insurance against repression by their opponents (Ginsburg).
Although the precise mechanism is different, this points again to the positive role played by
factional equilibrium, and indeed Mark Ramseyer argues that judicial independence is a function
of party competitiveness, which explains why, in a dominant-party system such as Japan’s, the
judiciary’s independence is quite limited.
The overall (still tentative) conclusions seem clear:
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1.

In most cases, robust political competition is a precondition to the

development of judicial independence, rather than the other way round.
2. In some cases, courts may find alternative ways to make themselves useful to
ruling politicians, even absent robust competition, and from this the courts may
find ways to expand their mandate, but these paths are unusual and idiosyncratic.
3. Judicial independence in commercial cases can be limited to those cases and
may not evolve into independence from ruling politicians even after considerable
time has elapsed.
4.

Without political support, what appears to be a significant rule-of-law

inheritance can be reversed.
5. Severe factionalism or violent conflict is not likely to produce the equilibrium
in which courts can find space in which to exercise judgment that is independent
of political actors.
6. The most promising course to promote judicial independence lies in promoting
democratic competition.
In short, judicial independence is generally an offshoot of moderate pluralism, expressed within
rules of a democratic game.
This configuration, however, is not easy to arrange. Worse, democratic pluralism would be
facilitated by the prior existence of the rule of law, the very condition we are aiming to achieve.
Worse yet, most countries in transition to democracy are divided, many severely divided, among
various ethnic, religious, racial, or linguistic groups. When we consider the character of the rule
of law as a public good---meaning for present purposes that its benefits are available to regime
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supporters and opponents alike---it becomes clear that a regime that does not represent all of the
contending groups will be inclined to prefer the distribution of selective goods, those benefits
that can be limited to its supporters, to public goods. And that means that such regimes, even if
they are electoral democracies, will disfavor development of the rule of law. All in all, a
discouraging picture.

